October 29, 2021

Women in Power: The Team Behind Nebraska’s Largest Solar Project

The solar industry is beginning to take steps to diversify and create new leadership and professional development pathways for women. At Sol Systems, we just completed our first project led by an all-woman development team. It also Nebraska’s largest solar project and Nebraska Public Power District’s (NPPD) first battery storage project. The project is an […]

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October 29, 2021

Mexico’s Energy Reform: Retreating from Private Energy Markets

Mexican lawmakers are close to dismantling the national renewable energy market by acting to pass a constitutional reform proposal that would fundamentally change the Mexican national power sector leaving renewable energy buyers and developers with nowhere to turn.  The proposal would devastate the energy market in the eleventh largest economy in the world. Despite increasing […]

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October 29, 2021

The Sol SOURCE – October 2021

Click here to read The Sol SOURCE October 2021. The Sol SOURCE is a renewables journal that our team distributes to our network of clients and solar stakeholders. Our newsletter contains trends and observations gained through interviews with our team, incorporating news from a variety of industry resources. Below, we have included excerpts from the […]

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October 21, 2021

Strategies for Reaching the Ethical, Eco-Conscious Consumer in 2021 and Beyond

The COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed a marked shift in the average consumer, highlighting health and well-being as a top consideration for consumer purchasing decisions while simultaneously creating a shift in how consumers made those purchases. The growing urgency of the call to act on climate change, coupled with renewed vigor around support for BIPOC businesses, also meant that consumers significantly changed how and where they were spending their money. 

October 18, 2021

AA21-291A: BlackMatter Ransomware

Original release date: October 18, 2021


Actions You Can Take Now to Protect Against BlackMatter Ransomware
• Implement and enforce backup and restoration policies and procedures.

Use strong, unique passwords.
Use multi-factor authentication.
• Implement network segmentation and traversal monitoring.

Note: this advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework, version 9. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.

This joint Cybersecurity Advisory was developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) to provide information on BlackMatter ransomware. Since July 2021, BlackMatter ransomware has targeted multiple U.S. critical infrastructure entities, including two U.S. Food and Agriculture Sector organizations.

This advisory provides information on cyber actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) obtained from a sample of BlackMatter ransomware analyzed in a sandbox environment as well from trusted third-party reporting. Using embedded, previously compromised credentials, BlackMatter leverages the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to access the Active Directory (AD) to discover all hosts on the network. BlackMatter then remotely encrypts the hosts and shared drives as they are found.

Ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure entities could directly affect consumer access to critical infrastructure services; therefore, CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge all organizations, including critical infrastructure organizations, to implement the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this joint advisory. These mitigations will help organizations reduce the risk of compromise from BlackMatter ransomware attacks.

Click here for a PDF version of this report.

Technical Details


First seen in July 2021, BlackMatter is ransomware-as-a-service (Raas) tool that allows  the ransomware's developers to profit from cybercriminal affiliates (i.e., BlackMatter actors) who deploy it against victims. BlackMatter is a possible rebrand of DarkSide, a RaaS which was active from September 2020 through May 2021. BlackMatter actors have attacked numerous U.S.-based organizations and have demanded ransom payments ranging from $80,000 to $15,000,000 in Bitcoin and Monero.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

This advisory provides information on cyber actor TTPs obtained from the following sample of BlackMatter ransomware, which was analyzed in a sandbox environment, as well as from trusted third parties: SHA-256: 706f3eec328e91ff7f66c8f0a2fb9b556325c153a329a2062dc85879c540839d. (Note: click here to see the sample’s page on VirusTotal.)

The BlackMatter variant uses embedded admin or user credentials that were previously compromised and NtQuerySystemInformation and EnumServicesStatusExW to enumerate running processes and services, respectively. BlackMatter then uses the embedded credentials in the LDAP and SMB protocol to discover all hosts in the AD and the srvsvc.NetShareEnumAll Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (MSRPC) function to enumerate each host for accessible shares. Notably, this variant of BlackMatter leverages the embedded credentials and SMB protocol to remotely encrypt, from the original compromised host, all discovered shares’ contents, including ADMIN$, C$, SYSVOL, and NETLOGON.

BlackMatter actors use a separate encryption binary for Linux-based machines and routinely encrypt ESXi virtual machines. Rather than encrypting backup systems, BlackMatter actors wipe or reformat backup data stores and appliances.

Table 1 maps BlackMatter’s capabilities to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, based on the analyzed variant and trusted third-party reporting.

Table 1: Black Matter Actors and Ransomware TTPs




Persistence [TA0003]

External Remote Services [T1133]

BlackMatter leverages legitimate remote monitoring and management software and remote desktop software, often by setting up trial accounts, to maintain persistence on victim networks. 

Credential Access [TA0006]

OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory [T1003.001]

BlackMatter harvests credentials from Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory using procmon.

Discovery [TA0007]

Remote System Discovery [T1018]

BlackMatter leverages LDAP and SMB protocol to discover all hosts in the AD.

Process Discovery [T1057]

BlackMatter uses NtQuerySystemInformation to enumerate running processes.

System Service Discovery [T1007]

BlackMatter uses EnumServicesStatusExW to enumerate running services on the network.

Lateral Movement [TA0008]

Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares [T1021.002]

BlackMatter uses srvsvc.NetShareEnumAll MSRPC function to enumerate and SMB to connect to all discovered shares, including ADMIN$, C$, SYSVOL, and NETLOGON.

Exfiltration [TA0010]

Exfiltration Over Web Service [T1567]

BlackMatter attempts to exfiltrate data for extortion.

Impact [TA0040]

Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486]

BlackMatter remotely encrypts shares via SMB protocol and drops a ransomware note in each directory.

Disk Wipe [T1561]

BlackMatter may wipe backup systems.

Detection Signatures

The following Snort signatures may be used for detecting network activity associated with BlackMatter activity.

Intrusion Detection System Rule:

alert tcp any any -> any 445 ( msg:"BlackMatter remote encryption attempt";  content:"|01 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 01 00|";  content:"|2e 00 52 00 45 00 41 00 44 00 4d 00 45 00 2e 00 74 00|"; distance:100; detection_filter: track by_src, count 4, seconds 1; priority:1; sid:11111111111; )

Inline Intrusion Prevention System Rule:

alert tcp any any -> any 445 ( msg:"BlackMatter remote encryption attempt";  content:"|01 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 01 00|";  content:"|2e 00 52 00 45 00 41 00 44 00 4d 00 45 00 2e 00 74 00|"; distance:100; priority:1; sid:10000001; )

rate_filter gen_id 1, sig_id 10000001, track by_src, count 4, seconds 1, new_action reject, timeout 86400


CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge network defenders, especially for critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise by BlackMatter ransomware:

Implement Detection Signatures

  • Implement the detection signatures identified above. These signatures will identify and block placement of the ransom note on the first share that is encrypted, subsequently blocking additional SMB traffic from the encryptor system for 24 hours. 

Use Strong Passwords

  • Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts.) to have strong, unique passwords. Passwords should not be reused across multiple accounts or stored on the system where an adversary may have access. Note: devices with local administrative accounts should implement a password policy that requires strong, unique passwords for each individual administrative account. 

Implement Multi-Factor Authentication

Patch and Update Systems

  • Keep all operating systems and software up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.

Limit Access to Resources over the Network

  • Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares, especially ADMIN$ and C$. If ADMIN$ and C$ are deemed operationally necessary, restrict privileges to only the necessary service or user accounts and perform continuous monitoring for anomalous activity.
  • Use a host-based firewall to only allow connections to administrative shares via SMB from a limited set of administrator machines. 

Implement Network Segmentation and Traversal Monitoring

Adversaries use system and network discovery techniques for network and system visibility and mapping. To limit an adversary from learning the organization’s enterprise environment, limit common system and network discovery techniques by taking the following actions.

  • Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. 
  • Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host. 

Use Admin Disabling Tools to Support Identity and Privileged Access Management

If BlackMatter uses compromised credentials during non-business hours, the compromise may not be detected. Given that there has been an observed increase in ransomware attacks during non-business hours, especially holidays and weekends, CISA, the FBI, and NSA recommend organizations:

  • Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin-level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the AD level when the account is not in direct need. When the account is needed, individual users submit their requests through an automated process that enables access to a system, but only for a set timeframe to support task completion. 
  • Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities that run from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. 

Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures

  • Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. This practice will ensure the organization will not be severely interrupted, have irretrievable data, or be held up by a ransom demand.
  • Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted) and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. 

CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge critical infrastructure organizations to apply the following additional mitigations to reduce the risk of credential compromise.

  • Disable the storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory.
  • Consider disabling or limiting New Technology Local Area Network Manager (NTLM) and WDigest Authentication.
  • Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (Refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA). 
  • Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity. Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ Ticket Granting service and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that attackers attempt to crack.
    • Set a strong password policy for service accounts.
    • Audit Domain Controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.  

Refer to the CISA-Multi-State information and Sharing Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide for general mitigations to prepare for and reduce the risk of compromise by ransomware attacks. 

Note: critical infrastructure organizations with industrial control systems/operational technology networks should review joint CISA-FBI Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-131A: DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks for more mitigations, including mitigations to reduce the risk of severe business or functional degradation should their entity fall victim to a ransomware attack. 

Responding to Ransomware Attacks

If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization, CISA, the FBI, and NSA recommend:

Note: CISA, the FBI, and NSA strongly discourage paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or may fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered.


  • For more information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer to StopRansomware.gov, a centralized, whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts.
  • CISA’s Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) is a no-cost self-assessment based on a tiered set of practices to help organizations better assess how well they are equipped to defend and recover from a ransomware incident. 
  • CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware. By requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.

Contact Information

Victims of ransomware should report it immediately to CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report, a local FBI Field Office, or U.S. Secret Service Field Office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the NSA Cybersecurity Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov.

This document was developed by CISA, the FBI, and NSA in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.

Note: the information you have accessed is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, and NSA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, or NSA.


  • October 18, 2021: Initial Version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

October 14, 2021

Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems

Original release date: October 14, 2021 | Last revised: October 25, 2021


Immediate Actions WWS Facilities Can Take Now to Protect Against Malicious Cyber Activity
• Do not click on suspicious links.

• If you use RDP, secure and monitor it.
Use strong passwords.
Use multi-factor authentication.

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework, version 9. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.

This joint advisory is the result of analytic efforts between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) to highlight ongoing malicious cyber activity—by both known and unknown actors—targeting the information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks, systems, and devices of U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector facilities. This activity—which includes attempts to compromise system integrity via unauthorized access—threatens the ability of WWS facilities to provide clean, potable water to, and effectively manage the wastewater of, their communities. Note: although cyber threats across critical infrastructure sectors are increasing, this advisory does not intend to indicate greater targeting of the WWS Sector versus others.

To secure WWS facilities—including Department of Defense (DoD) water treatment facilities in the United States and abroad—against the TTPs listed below, CISA, FBI, EPA, and NSA strongly urge organizations to implement the measures described in the Recommended Mitigations section of this advisory.

Click here for a PDF version of this report.

Technical Details

Threat Overview

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

WWS facilities may be vulnerable to the following common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors to compromise IT and OT networks, systems, and devices.

  • Spearphishing personnel to deliver malicious payloads, including ransomware [T1566].
    •  Spearphishing is one of the most prevalent techniques used for initial access to IT networks. Personnel and their potential lack of cyber awareness are a vulnerability within an organization. Personnel may open malicious attachments or links to execute malicious payloads contained in emails from threat actors that have successfully bypassed email filtering controls.
    • When organizations integrate IT with OT systems, attackers can gain access—either purposefully or inadvertently—to OT assets after the IT network has been compromised through spearphishing and other techniques.
    • Exploitation of internet-connected services and applications that enable remote access to WWS networks [T1210].
      • For example, threat actors can exploit a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) that is insecurely connected to the internet to infect a network with ransomware. If the RDP is used for process control equipment, the attacker could also compromise WWS operations. Note: the increased use of remote operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic has likely increased the prevalence of weaknesses associated with remote access.
  • Exploitation of unsupported or outdated operating systems and software.
    • Threat actors likely seek to take advantage of perceived weaknesses among organizations that either do not have—or choose not to prioritize—resources for IT/OT infrastructure modernization. WWS facilities tend to allocate resources to physical infrastructure in need of replacement or repair (e.g., pipes) rather than IT/OT infrastructure.
    • The fact that WWS facilities are inconsistently resourced municipal systems—not all of which have the resources to employ consistently high cybersecurity standards—may contribute to the use of unsupported or outdated operating systems and software.
  • Exploitation of control system devices with vulnerable firmware versions.
    • WWS systems commonly use outdated control system devices or firmware versions, which expose WWS networks to publicly accessible and remotely executable vulnerabilities. Successful compromise of these devices may lead to loss of system control, denial of service, or loss of sensitive data [T0827].

WWS Sector Cyber Intrusions

Cyber intrusions targeting U.S. WWS facilities highlight vulnerabilities associated with the following threats:

  • Insider threats, from current or former employees who maintain improperly active credentials
  • Ransomware attacks

WWS Sector cyber intrusions from 2019 to early 2021 include:

  • In August 2021, malicious cyber actors used Ghost variant ransomware against a California-based WWS facility. The ransomware variant had been in the system for about a month and was discovered when three supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) servers displayed a ransomware message.
  • In July 2021, cyber actors used remote access to introduce ZuCaNo ransomware onto a Maine-based WWS facility’s wastewater SCADA computer. The treatment system was run manually until the SCADA computer was restored using local control and more frequent operator rounds.
  • In March 2021, cyber actors used an unknown ransomware variant against a Nevada-based WWS facility. The ransomware affected the victim’s SCADA system and backup systems. The SCADA system provides visibility and monitoring but is not a full industrial control system (ICS).
  • In September 2020, personnel at a New Jersey-based WWS facility discovered potential Makop ransomware had compromised files within their system.
  • In March 2019, a former employee at Kansas-based WWS facility unsuccessfully attempted to threaten drinking water safety by using his user credentials, which had not been revoked at the time of his resignation, to remotely access a facility computer.


The FBI, CISA, EPA, and NSA recommend WWS facilities—including DoD water treatment facilities in the United States and abroad—use a risk-informed analysis to determine the applicability of a range of technical and non-technical mitigations to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber threats.

WWS Monitoring

Personnel responsible for monitoring WWS should check for the following suspicious activities and indicators, which may be indicative of threat actor activity:

  • Inability of WWS facility personnel to access SCADA system controls at any time, either entirely or in part;
  • Unfamiliar data windows or system alerts appearing on SCADA system controls and facility data screens that could indicate a ransomware attack;
  • Detection by SCADA system controls, or by water treatment personnel, of abnormal operating parameters—such as unusually high chemical addition rates—used in the safe and proper treatment of drinking water;
  • Access of SCADA systems by unauthorized individuals or groups, e.g., former employees and current employees not authorized/assigned to operate SCADA systems and controls.
  • Access of SCADA systems at unusual times, which may indicate that a legitimate user’s credentials have been compromised
  • Unexplained SCADA system restarts.
  • Unchanging parameter values that normally fluctuate.

Remote Access Mitigations

Note: The increased use of remote operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic increases the necessity for asset owner-operators to assess the risk associated with enhanced remote access to ensure it falls within acceptable levels. 

  • Require multi-factor authentication for all remote access to the OT network, including from the IT network and external networks.
  • Utilize blocklisting and allowlisting to limit remote access to users with a verified business and/or operational need.
  • Ensure that all remote access technologies have logging enabled and regularly audit these logs to identify instances of unauthorized access.
  • Utilize manual start and stop features in place of always activated unattended access to reduce the time remote access services are running.
  • Audit networks for systems using remote access services.
    • Close unneeded network ports associated with remote access services (e.g., RDP – Transmission Control Protocol [TCP] Port 3389).
  • When configuring access control for a host, utilize custom settings to limit the access a remote party can attempt to acquire.

Network Mitigations

  • Implement and ensure robust network segmentation between IT and OT networks to limit the ability of malicious cyber actors to pivot to the OT network after compromising the IT network.
    • Implement demilitarized zones (DMZs), firewalls, jump servers, and one-way communication diodes to prevent unregulated communication between the IT and OT networks.
  • Develop/update network maps to ensure a full accounting of all equipment that is connected to the network.
    • Remove any equipment from networks that is not required to conduct operations to reduce the attack surface malicious actors can exploit.  

Planning and Operational Mitigations

  • Ensure the organization’s emergency response plan considers the full range of potential impacts that cyberattacks pose to operations, including loss or manipulation of view, loss or manipulation of control, and threats to safety.
    • The plan should also consider third parties with legitimate need for OT network access, including engineers and vendors.
    • Review, test, and update the emergency response plan on an annual basis to ensure accuracy.
  • Exercise the ability to fail over to alternate control systems, including manual operation while assuming degraded electronic communications.
  • Allow employees to gain decision-making experience via tabletop exercises that incorporate loss of visibility and control scenarios. Utilize resources such as the Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) Cybersecurity Incident Action Checklist as well as the Ransomware Response Checklist on p. 11 of the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.

Safety System Mitigations

  • Install independent cyber-physical safety systems. These are systems that physically prevent dangerous conditions from occurring if the control system is compromised by a threat actor.
    • Examples of cyber-physical safety system controls include:
      • Size of the chemical feed pump
      • Gearing on valves
      • Pressure switches, etc.
    • These types of controls benefit WWS Sector facilities—especially smaller facilities with limited cybersecurity capability—because they enable facility staff to assess systems from a worst-case scenario and determine protective solutions. Enabling cyber-physical safety systems allows operators to take physical steps to limit the damage, for example, by preventing cyber actors, who have gained control of a sodium hydroxide pump, from raising the pH to dangerous levels.

Additional Mitigations

  • Foster an organizational culture of cyber readiness. See the CISA Cyber Essentials along with the items listed in the Resources section below for guidance.  
  • Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets. Use a risk-based assessment strategy to determine which OT network assets and zones should participate in the patch management program. Consider using a centralized patch management system.
  • Set antivirus/antimalware programs to conduct regular scans of IT network assets using up-to-date signatures. Use a risk-based asset inventory strategy to determine how OT network assets are identified and evaluated for the presence of malware.  
  • Implement regular data backup procedures on both the IT and OT networks.
    • Regularly test backups.
    • Ensure backups are not connected to the network to prevent the potential spread of ransomware to the backups.
  • When possible, enable OT device authentication, utilize the encrypted version of OT protocols, and encrypt all wireless communications to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of process control data in transit.
  • Employ user account management to:
    • Remove, disable, or rename any default system accounts wherever possible.
    • Implement account lockout policies to reduce risk from brute-force attacks.
    • Monitor the creation of administrator-level accounts by third-party vendors with robust and privileged account management policies and procedures.
    • Implement a user account policy that includes set durations for deactivation and removal of accounts after employees leave the organization or after accounts reach a defined period of inactivity.
  • Implement data execution prevention controls, such as application allowlisting and software restriction policies that prevent programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary folders supporting popular internet browsers.
  • Train users through awareness and simulations to recognize and report phishing and social engineering attempts. Identify and suspend access of users exhibiting unusual activity.

FBI, CISA, EPA, and NSA would like to thank Dragos as well as the WaterISAC for their contributions to this advisory.


Cyber Hygiene Services

CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services—including vulnerability scanning and ransomware readiness assessments—to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to cyber threats. By taking advantage of these services, organizations of any size will receive recommendations on ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors. 

Rewards for Justice Reporting

The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely.


The StopRansomware.gov webpage is an interagency resource that provides guidance on ransomware protection, detection, and response. This includes ransomware alerts, reports, and resources from CISA and other federal partners, including:

Additional Resources

For additional resources that can assist in preventing and mitigating this activity, see:

Disclaimer of Endorsement 

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Contact Information

To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. If you have any further questions related to this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov.


  • Initial Version: October 14, 2021
  • October 25, 2021: Corrected typo in Additional Resources

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

October 7, 2021

Rebranding the Role of the CMO

Changing customer needs, shifting client expectations, rapidly evolving technology, unforeseen global circumstances and long overdue social awakenings… plain and simple, marketing is not what it “used to be.” The classic marketing mix of product, price, place and promotion - the 4 P’s seared into the memories of those of us who may have majored in marketing and communications back in the day - has become much more nuanced and a whole lot more complex.