MAR-10430311-1.v1 Multiple Nation-State Threat Actors Exploit CVE-2022-47966 and CVE-2022-42475 | CISA

Go to Source September 6, 2023

Notification

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Summary

Description

CISA received 4 files for analysis from an incident response engagement conducted at an Aeronautical Sector organization.

2 files (bitmap.exe, wkHPd.exe) are identified as variants of Metasploit (Meterpreter) and designed to connect and receive unencrypted payloads from their respective command and control (C2) servers. Note: Metasploit is an open source penetration testing software; Meterpreter is a Metasploit attack payload that runs an interactive shell. These executables are used as attack payloads to run interactive shells, allowing a malicious actor the ability to control and execute code on a system.

2 files (resource.aspx, ConfigLogin.aspx) are Active Server Pages (ASPX) web shells designed to execute remote JavaScript code on the victim server.

CISA has provided indicators of compromise (IOCs) and YARA rules for detection within this Malware Analysis Report (MAR).

For more information about this compromise, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Multiple Nation-State Threat Actors Exploit CVE-2022-47966 and CVE-2022-42475.

Download the PDF version of this report:

For a downloadable copy of IOCs associated with this MAR in JSON format, see:

Submitted Files (4)

334c2d0af191ed96b15095a4a098c400f2c0ce6b9c66d1800f6b74554d59ff4b (bitmap.exe)

47dacb8f0b157355a4fd59ccbac1c59b8268fe84f3b8a462378b064333920622 (resource.aspx)

6dcc7b5e913154abac69687fcfb6a58ac66ec9b8cc7de7afd8832a9066b7bdde (ConfigLogin.aspx)

79a9136eedbf8288ad7357ddaea3a3cd1a57b7c6f82adffd5a9540e1623bfb63 (wkHPd.exe)

IPs (2)

108[.]62[.]118[.]160

179[.]60[.]147[.]4

Findings

334c2d0af191ed96b15095a4a098c400f2c0ce6b9c66d1800f6b74554d59ff4b

Tags

downloaderobfuscatedtrojan

Details

–>

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_10430311_01 : METERPRETER trojan downloader
  {
     meta:
         author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
         incident = “10430311”
         date = “2023-03-03”
         last_modified = “20230404_1200”
         actor = “n/a”
         family = “METERPRETER”
         Capabilities = “n/a”
         Malware_Type = “trojan downloader”
         Tool_Type = “n/a”
         description = “Detects trojan downloader samples”
         sha256_1 = “334c2d0af191ed96b15095a4a098c400f2c0ce6b9c66d1800f6b74554d59ff4b”
     strings:
         $s1 = { 49 be 77 73 32 5f 33 32 }
         $s2 = { 49 89 e6 48 81 ec a0 01 }
         $s3 = { 49 bc 02 00 e5 6b b3 3c 93 04 }
         $s4 = { 41 ba 4c 77 26 07 ff d5 }
         $s5 = { 41 ba ea 0f df e0 ff d5 }
         $s6 = { 41 ba 99 a5 74 61 ff d5 }
         $s7 = { 41 ba 02 d9 c8 5f ff d5 }
         $s8 = { 41 ba 58 a4 53 e5 ff d5 }
     condition:
         all of them
  }
• rule CISA_10430311_02 : METERPRETER controls_local_machine compromises_data_integrity communicates_with_c2 keylogger exploit_kit remote_access_trojan back downloader screen_capture virus remote_access exploitation network_capture
  {
     meta:
         author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
         incident = “10430311”
         date = “2023-03-08”
         last_modified = “20230405_1300”
         actor = “n/a”
         family = “METERPRETER”
         Capabilities = “controls-local-machine compromises-data-integrity communicates-with-c2”
         Malware_Type = “keylogger exploit-kit remote-access-trojan backdoor downloader screen-capture virus”
         Tool_Type = “remote-access exploitation network-capture”
         description = “Detects Fresh Meterpreter bianary samples”
         sha256_1 = “79a9136eedbf8288ad7357ddaea3a3cd1a57b7c6f82adffd5a9540e1623bfb63”
         sha256_2 = “334c2d0af191ed96b15095a4a098c400f2c0ce6b9c66d1800f6b74554d59ff4b”
         sha256_3 = “6dcc7b5e913154abac69687fcfb6a58ac66ec9b8cc7de7afd8832a9066b7bdde”
         sha256_4 = “47dacb8f0b157355a4fd59ccbac1c59b8268fe84f3b8a462378b064333920622”
     strings:
         $s0 = { 58 a4 53 e5 }
         $s1 = { 02 d9 c8 5f }
         $s2 = { 99 a5 74 61 }
         $s3 = { 4c 77 26 07 }
         $s4 = { 29 80 6b 00 }
         $s5 = { 50 41 59 4c 4f 41 44 3a }
         $s6 = { 48 83 ec 28 49 c7 c1 40 }
     condition:
         all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious Windows executable file. The file is designed to connect to a remote Internet Protocol (IP) address “179[.]60[.]147[.]4” on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 58731 and waits for a response. The response payload from the remote server is not encrypted and will be executed in memory. The payload was not available for analysis.

179[.]60[.]147[.]4

Tags

command-and-control

Ports

Whois

inetnum:     179.60.147.0/24
status:     reallocated
aut-num:     AS209588
owner:     Cloud Solutions S.A.
ownerid:     VE-CSSA1-LACNIC
responsible: Alexis Sanchez
address:     Av. Libertador, Distrito Capital, —,
address:     1050 – Caracas –
country:     VE
phone:     +507 8589115
owner-c:     ALS317
tech-c:     ALS317
abuse-c:     ALS317
inetrev:     179.60.147.0/24
nserver:     NS1.SAFE-VPN.MOBI
nsstat:     20230302 AA
nslastaa:    20230302
nserver:     NS2.SAFE-VPN.MOBI
nsstat:     20230302 AA
nslastaa:    20230302
created:     20220301
changed:     20220301
inetnum-up: 179.60.144.0/21

nic-hdl:     ALS317
person:     Alexis Sanchez
e-mail:     [email protected]
address:     Av. Libertador, Distrito Capital, —, —
address:     1050 – Caracas –
country:     VE
phone:     +507 858 91 [15]
created:     20220301
changed:     20220301

Relationships

Description

The malware C2 server IP address.

79a9136eedbf8288ad7357ddaea3a3cd1a57b7c6f82adffd5a9540e1623bfb63

Tags

obfuscatedtrojan

Details

–>

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_10430311_02 : METERPRETER controls_local_machine compromises_data_integrity communicates_with_c2 keylogger exploit_kit remote_access_trojan back downloader screen_capture virus remote_access exploitation network_capture
  {
     meta:
         author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
         incident = “10430311”
         date = “2023-03-08”
         last_modified = “20230405_1300”
         actor = “n/a”
         family = “METERPRETER”
         Capabilities = “controls-local-machine compromises-data-integrity communicates-with-c2”
         Malware_Type = “keylogger exploit-kit remote-access-trojan backdoor downloader screen-capture virus”
         Tool_Type = “remote-access exploitation network-capture”
         description = “Detects Fresh Meterpreter bianary samples”
         sha256_1 = “79a9136eedbf8288ad7357ddaea3a3cd1a57b7c6f82adffd5a9540e1623bfb63”
         sha256_2 = “334c2d0af191ed96b15095a4a098c400f2c0ce6b9c66d1800f6b74554d59ff4b”
         sha256_3 = “6dcc7b5e913154abac69687fcfb6a58ac66ec9b8cc7de7afd8832a9066b7bdde”
         sha256_4 = “47dacb8f0b157355a4fd59ccbac1c59b8268fe84f3b8a462378b064333920622”
     strings:
         $s0 = { 58 a4 53 e5 }
         $s1 = { 02 d9 c8 5f }
         $s2 = { 99 a5 74 61 }
         $s3 = { 4c 77 26 07 }
         $s4 = { 29 80 6b 00 }
         $s5 = { 50 41 59 4c 4f 41 44 3a }
         $s6 = { 48 83 ec 28 49 c7 c1 40 }
     condition:
         all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This file is a malicious 64-bit Windows Portable Executable (PE) that has been identified as a variant of the Metasploit Meterpreter application. The file is designed to connect to a remote Internet Protocol (IP) address 108[.]62[.]118[.]160.

108[.]62[.]118[.]160

Tags

command-and-control

Whois

NetRange:     108.62.0.0 – 108.62.255.255
CIDR:         108.62.0.0/16
NetName:        NET-108-62-0-0-1
NetHandle:     NET-108-62-0-0-1
Parent:         NET108 (NET-108-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:     AS15003
Organization: Leaseweb USA, Inc. (LU)
RegDate:        2010-12-13
Updated:        2021-02-15
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/108.62.0.0

OrgName:        Leaseweb USA, Inc.
OrgId:         LU
Address:        9480 Innovation Dr
City:         Manassas
StateProv:     VA
PostalCode:     20109
Country:        US
RegDate:        2010-09-13
Updated:        2019-08-13
Comment:        www.leaseweb.com
Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/LU

Relationships

Description

The malware attempts to connect to this IP address.

47dacb8f0b157355a4fd59ccbac1c59b8268fe84f3b8a462378b064333920622

Tags

backdoorwebshell

Details

–>

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_10430311_03 : ASPX_WEBSHELL webshell
  {
     meta:
         author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
         incident = “10430311”
         date = “2023-03-21”
         last_modified = “20230404_1230”
         actor = “n/a”
         family = “ASPX Webshell”
         Capabilities = “n/a”
         Malware_Type = “webshell”
         Tool_Type = “n/a”
         description = “Detects OWA targeting ASPX Webshell samples”
         sha256_1 = “6dcc7b5e913154abac69687fcfb6a58ac66ec9b8cc7de7afd8832a9066b7bdde”
         sha256_1 = “47dacb8f0b157355a4fd59ccbac1c59b8268fe84f3b8a462378b064333920622”
     strings:
         $s1 = { 5a 30 32 6a 77 36 43 36 63 55 }
         $s2 = { 5a 38 49 30 32 38 33 6e 77 38 }
         $s3 = { 4f 57 41 77 65 62 63 6f 6e 66 69 67 }
         $s4 = { 54 55 43 53 4f 4e }
         $s5 = { 65 76 61 6c }
     condition:
         3 of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This artifact is an ASPX webshell that is designed to execute remote JavaScript code on the system. The attacker must authenticate to the webshell client with the key “OWAwebconfig” before executing the remote code. The ‘unsafe’ context keyword is intentionally obfuscated to bypass security protocols.

Screenshots

6dcc7b5e913154abac69687fcfb6a58ac66ec9b8cc7de7afd8832a9066b7bdde

Tags

backdoorwebshell

Details

–>

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule CISA_10430311_03 : ASPX_WEBSHELL webshell
  {
     meta:
         author = “CISA Code & Media Analysis”
         incident = “10430311”
         date = “2023-03-21”
         last_modified = “20230404_1230”
         actor = “n/a”
         family = “ASPX Webshell”
         Capabilities = “n/a”
         Malware_Type = “webshell”
         Tool_Type = “n/a”
         description = “Detects OWA targeting ASPX Webshell samples”
         sha256_1 = “6dcc7b5e913154abac69687fcfb6a58ac66ec9b8cc7de7afd8832a9066b7bdde”
         sha256_1 = “47dacb8f0b157355a4fd59ccbac1c59b8268fe84f3b8a462378b064333920622”
     strings:
         $s1 = { 5a 30 32 6a 77 36 43 36 63 55 }
         $s2 = { 5a 38 49 30 32 38 33 6e 77 38 }
         $s3 = { 4f 57 41 77 65 62 63 6f 6e 66 69 67 }
         $s4 = { 54 55 43 53 4f 4e }
         $s5 = { 65 76 61 6c }
     condition:
         3 of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This artifact is an ASPX webshell that is designed to execute remote JavaScript code on the system. The attacker must authenticate to the webshell client with the key “TUCSON” before executing the remote code. The ‘unsafe’ context keyword is intentionally obfuscated to bypass security protocols.

Screenshots

Relationship Summary

Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

• Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
• Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
• Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
• Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
• Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
• Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
• Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
• Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
• Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
• Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
• Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
• Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
• Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

Contact Information

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Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.cisa.gov.