RSS Alerts from National Cyber Awareness System
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to disseminate known BianLian ransomware and data extortion group IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI and ACSC investigations as of March 2023.
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from BianLian ransomware and data extortion: |
BianLian is a ransomware developer, deployer, and data extortion cybercriminal group that has targeted organizations in multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since June 2022. They have also targeted Australian critical infrastructure sectors in addition to professional services and property development. The group gains access to victim systems through valid Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, uses open-source tools and command-line scripting for discovery and credential harvesting, and exfiltrates victim data via File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Rclone, or Mega. BianLian group actors then extort money by threatening to release data if payment is not made. BianLian group originally employed a double-extortion model in which they encrypted victims’ systems after exfiltrating the data; however, around January 2023, they shifted to primarily exfiltration-based extortion.
FBI, CISA, and ACSC encourage critical infrastructure organizations and small- and medium-sized organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of BianLian and other ransomware incidents.
Download the PDF version of this report (710kb):
For a downloadable copy of IOCs (35kb), see:
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 13. See the MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
BianLian is a ransomware developer, deployer, and data extortion cybercriminal group. FBI observed BianLian group targeting organizations in multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since June 2022. In Australia, ACSC has observed BianLian group predominately targeting private enterprises, including one critical infrastructure organization. BianLian group originally employed a double-extortion model in which they exfiltrated financial, client, business, technical, and personal files for leverage and encrypted victims’ systems. In 2023, FBI observed BianLian shift to primarily exfiltration-based extortion with victims’ systems left intact, and ACSC observed BianLian shift exclusively to exfiltration-based extortion. BianLian actors warn of financial, business, and legal ramifications if payment is not made.
BianLian group actors gain initial access to networks by leveraging compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials likely acquired from initial access brokers [T1078],[T1133] or via phishing [T1566].
BianLian group actors implant a custom backdoor specific to each victim written in Go (see the Indicators of Compromise Section for an example) [T1587.001] and install remote management and access software—e.g., TeamViewer, Atera Agent, SplashTop, AnyDesk—for persistence and command and control [T1105],[T1219].
FBI also observed BianLian group actors create and/or activate local administrator accounts [T1136.001] and change those account passwords [T1098].
BianLian group actors use PowerShell [T1059.001] and Windows Command Shell [T1059.003] to disable antivirus tools [T1562.001], specifically Windows defender and Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI). BianLian actors modify the Windows Registry [T1112] to disable tamper protection for Sophos SAVEnabled, SEDEenabled, and SAVService services, which enables them to uninstall these services. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands they have used.
BianLian group actors use a combination of compiled tools, which they first download to the victim environment, to learn about the victim’s environment. BianLian group actors have used:
BianLian actors also use native Windows tools and Windows Command Shell to:
See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands they have used.
BianLian group uses valid accounts for lateral movement through the network and to pursue other follow-on activity. To obtain the credentials, BianLian group actors use Windows Command Shell to find unsecured credentials on the local machine [T1552.001]. FBI also observed BianLian harvest credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001], download RDP Recognizer (a tool that could be used to brute force RDP passwords or check for RDP vulnerabilities) to the victim system, and attempt to access an Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) [T1003.003].
In one case, FBI observed BianLian actors use a portable executable version of an Impacket tool (secretsdump.py) to move laterally to a domain controller and harvest credential hashes from it. Note: Impacket is a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on a remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network. Threat actors can run portable executable files on victim systems using local user rights, assuming the executable is not blocked by an application allowlist or antivirus solution.
See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.
BianLian group actors use PsExec and RDP with valid accounts for lateral movement [T1021.001]. Prior to using RDP, BianLian actors used Command Shell and native Windows tools to add user accounts to the local Remote Desktop Users group, modified the added account’s password, and modified Windows firewall rules to allow incoming RDP traffic [T1562.004]. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.
In one case, FBI found a forensic artifact (exp.exe) on a compromised system that likely exploits the Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) and connects to a domain controller.
FBI observed BianLian group actors using malware (system.exe) that enumerates registry [T1012] and files [T1083] and copies clipboard data from users [T1115].
BianLian group actors search for sensitive files using PowerShell scripts (See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity) and exfiltrate them for data extortion. Prior to January 2023, BianLian actors encrypted files [T1486] after exfiltration for double extortion.
BianLian group uses File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [T1048] and Rclone, a tool used to sync files to cloud storage, to exfiltrate data [T1537]. FBI observed BianLian group actors install Rclone and other files in generic and typically unchecked folders such as programdatavmware and music folders. ACSC observed BianLian group actors use Mega file-sharing service to exfiltrate victim data [T1567.002].
BianLian’s encryptor (encryptor.exe) modified all encrypted files to have the .bianlian extension. The encryptor created a ransom note, Look at this instruction.txt, in each affected directory (see Figure 1 for an example ransom note.) According to the ransom note, BianLian group specifically looked for, encrypted, and exfiltrated financial, client, business, technical, and personal files.
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If a victim refuses to pay the ransom demand, BianLian group threatens to publish exfiltrated data to a leak site maintained on the Tor network. The ransom note provides the Tox ID A4B3B0845DA242A64BF17E0DB4278EDF85855739667D3E2AE8B89D5439015F07E81D12D767FC, which does not vary across victims. The Tox ID directs the victim organization to a Tox chat via https://qtox.github[.]io and includes an alternative contact email address (swikipedia@onionmail[.]org or xxx@mail2tor[.]com). The email address is also the same address listed on the group’s Tor site under the contact information section. Each victim company is assigned a unique identifier included in the ransom note. BianLian group receives payments in unique cryptocurrency wallets for each victim company.
BianLian group engages in additional techniques to pressure the victim into paying the ransom; for example, printing the ransom note to printers on the compromised network. Employees of victim companies also reported receiving threatening telephone calls from individuals associated with BianLian group.
See Table 1 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations as of March 2023.
Name |
SHA-256 Hash |
Description |
7b15f570a23a5c5ce8ff942da60834a9d0549ea3ea9f34f900a09331325df893 |
Malware associated with BianLian intrusions, which is an example of a possible backdoor developed by BianLian group. |
|
1fd07b8d1728e416f897bef4f1471126f9b18ef108eb952f4b75050da22e8e43 |
Example of a BianLian encryptor. |
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0c1eb11de3a533689267ba075e49d93d55308525c04d6aff0d2c54d1f52f5500 |
Possible NetLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) exploitation. |
|
40126ae71b857dd22db39611c25d3d5dd0e60316b72830e930fba9baf23973ce |
Enumerates registry and files. Reads clipboard data. |
See Table 2 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
---|---|---|
Resource Development |
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Develop Capabilities: Malware |
BianLian group actors developed a custom backdoor used in their intrusions. |
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Initial Access |
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External Remote Services |
BianLian group actors used RDP with valid accounts as a means of gaining initial access and for lateral movement. |
|
Phishing |
BianLian group actors used phishing to obtain valid user credentials for initial access. |
|
Valid Accounts |
BianLian group actors used RDP with valid accounts as a means of gaining initial access and for lateral movement. |
|
Execution |
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Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
BianLian group actors used PowerShell to disable AMSI on Windows. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information. |
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Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
BianLian group actors used Windows Command Shell to disable antivirus tools, for discovery, and to execute their tools on victim networks. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information. |
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Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
BianLian group actors used a Scheduled Task run as SYSTEM (the highest privilege Windows accounts) to execute a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file daily. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information. |
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Persistence |
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Account Manipulation |
BianLian group actors changed the password of an account they created. BianLian actors modified the password of an account they added to the local Remote Desktop Users group. |
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Create Account: Local Account |
BianLian group actors created/activated a local administrator account. BianLian group actors used net.exe to add a user account to the local Remote Desktop Users group. (See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for more information.) |
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Defense Evasion |
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Modify Registry |
BianLian group actors modified the registry to disable user authentication for RDP connections, allow a user to receive help from Remote Assistance, and disable tamper protection for Sophos SAVEnabled, SEDEenabled, and SAVService services, which enables them to uninstall these services. |
|
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
BianLian group actors disabled Windows defender, AMSI, and Sophos SAVEnabled and SEDEenabled tamper protection services. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information. |
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Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
BianLian group actors added modified firewalls to allow RDP traffic by adding new rules to the Windows firewall that allow incoming RDP traffic and enable a pre-existing Windows firewall rule group named Remote Desktop. |
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Credential Access |
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OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
BianLian group actors accessed credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information. |
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OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
BianLian group actors attempted to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information and to obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. |
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Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files |
BianLian group actors searched local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. |
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Discovery |
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Account Discovery: Domain Account |
BianLian group actors queried the domain controller to identify accounts in the Domain Admins and Domain Computers groups. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on activity. |
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Domain Trust Discovery |
BianLian group actors used PingCastle to enumerate the AD and map trust relationships. BianLian group actors retrieved a list of domain trust relationships used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. |
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File and Directory Discovery |
BianLian group used malware (system.exe) that enumerates files. |
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Network Service Discovery |
BianLian actors used Advanced Port Scanner and SoftPerfect Network Scanner to ping computers, scan ports, and identify program versions running on ports. |
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Network Share Discovery |
BianLian actors used SoftPerfect Network Scanner, which can discover shared folders. BianLian group actors used SharpShares to enumerate accessible network shares in a domain. |
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Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
BianLian group actors queried the domain controller to identify groups. |
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Query Registry |
BianLian group used malware (system.exe) that enumerates registry. |
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Remote System Discovery |
BianLian group actors attempted to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement. BianLian group actors retrieved a list of domain controllers. |
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System Owner User Discovery |
BianLian group actors queried currently logged-in users on a machine. |
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Lateral Movement |
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Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
BianLian group actors used RDP with valid accounts for lateral movement. |
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Collection |
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Clipboard Data |
BianLian group actors’ malware collects data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. |
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Command and Control |
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Ingress Tool Transfer |
BianLian group actors transferred tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. |
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Remote Access Software |
BianLian group actors used legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as TeamViewer, Atera, and SplashTop, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. |
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Exfiltration |
||
Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
BianLian group actors used Rclone to exfiltrate data to a cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. |
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Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
BianLian group actors exfiltrated data via FTP. |
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Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
BianLian group actors exfiltrated data via Mega public file-sharing service. |
|
Impact |
||
Data Encrypted for Impact |
BianLian group actors encrypted data on target systems. |
FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
See NSA Cybersecurity Information sheet Enforce Signed Software Execution Policies for additional guidance.
In addition, FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the impact and risk of compromise by ransomware or data extortion actors:
In addition to applying mitigations, FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, including boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with BianLian actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom, as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office or CISA at cisa.gov/report. Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance in regard to a ransomware incident can contact ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371) or by submitting a report cyber.gov.au.
Microsoft and Sophos contributed to this advisory.
Through FBI investigations as of March 2023, FBI has observed BianLian actors use the commands in Table 3. ACSC has observed BianLian actors use some of the same commands.
Command |
Use |
[Ref].Assembly.GetType(‘System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils’).GetField(‘amsiInitFailed’,’NonPublic,* Static’).SetValue($null,$true) |
Disables the AMSI on Windows. AMSI is a built-in feature on Windows 10 and newer that provides an interface for anti-malware scanners to inspect scripts prior to execution. When AMSI is disabled, malicious scripts may bypass antivirus solutions and execute undetected. |
cmd.exe /Q /c for /f “tokens=1,2 delims= “ ^%A in (‘”tasklist /fi “Imagename eq lsass.exe” | find “lsass””’) do rundll32.exe C:windowsSystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump ^%B WindowsTemp |
Creates a memory dump lsass.exe process and saves it as a CSV filehttps://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1003/001/. BianLian actors used it to harvest credentials from lsass.exe. |
cmd.exe /Q /c net user |
Activates the local Administrator account. |
cmd.exe /Q /c net user " |
Changes the password of the newly activated local Administrator account. |
cmd.exe /Q /c quser 1> \127.0.0.1C$WindowsTemp |
Executes quser.exe to query the currently logged-in users on a machine. The command is provided arguments to run quietly and exit upon completion, and the output is directed to the WindowsTemp directory. |
dism.exe /online /Disable-Feature /FeatureName:Windows-Defender /Remove /NoRestart |
Using the Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) executable file, removes the Windows Defender feature. |
dump.exe -no-pass -just-dc user.local/ |
Executes secretsdump.py, a Portable Executable version of an Impacket tool. Used to dump password hashes from domain controllers. |
exp.exe -n |
Possibly attempted exploitation of the NetLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472). |
findstr /spin "password" *.* >C:UserstrainingMusic |
Searches for the string password in all files in the current directory and its subdirectories and puts the output to a file. |
ldap.exe -u user |
Connects to the organization’s Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server. |
logoff |
Logs off the current user from a Windows session. Can be used to log off multiple users at once. |
mstsc |
Launches Microsoft Remote Desktop Connection client application in Windows. |
net group /domain |
Retrieves a list of all groups from the domain controller. |
net group 'Domain Admins' /domain |
Queries the domain controller to retrieve a list of all accounts from Domain Admins group. |
net group 'Domain Computers' /domain |
Queries the domain controller to retrieve a list of all accounts from Domain Computers group. |
net user /domain |
Queries the domain controller to retrieve a list of all users in the domain. |
net.exe localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" |
Adds a user account to the local Remote Desktop Users group. |
net.exe user |
Modifies the password for the specified account. |
netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule "name=allow RemoteDesktop" dir=in * protocol=TCP localport= |
Adds a new rule to the Windows firewall that allows incoming RDP traffic. |
netsh.exe advfirewall firewall set rule "group=remote desktop" new enable=Yes |
Enables the pre-existing Windows firewall rule group named Remote Desktop. This rule group allows incoming RDP traffic. |
nltest /dclist |
Retrieves a list of domain controllers. |
nltest /domain_trusts |
Retrieves a list of domain trusts. |
ping.exe -4 -n 1 * |
Sends a single ICMP echo request packet to all devices on the local network using the IPv4 protocol. The output of the command will show if the device is reachable or not. |
quser; ([adsisearcher]"(ObjectClass=computer)").FindAll().count;([adsisearcher]"(ObjectClass=user)").FindAll().count;[Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | select name;net user "$env:USERNAME" /domain; (Get-WmiObject -class Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption; Get-WmiObject -Namespace rootcimv2 -Class Win32_ComputerSystem; net group "domain admins" /domain; nltest /dclist:; nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS |
Lists the current Windows identity for the logged-in user and displays the user's name. Uses the Active Directory Services Interface (ADSI) to search for all computer and user objects in the domain and returns counts of the quantities found. Lists information about the current user account from the domain, such as the user's name, description, and group memberships. Lists information about the operating system installed on the local computer. Lists information about the "Domain Admins" group from the domain. Lists all domain controllers in the domain. Displays information about domain trusts. |
reg.exe add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlTerminal * ServerWinStationsRDP-Tcp" /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f |
Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to disable user authentication for RDP connections. |
reg.exe add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlTerminal Server" /* v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f |
Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to allow a user to receive help from Remote Assistance. |
reg.exe add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetServicesSophos Endpoint * DefenseTamperProtectionConfig" /t REG_DWORD /v SAVEnabled /d 0 /f |
Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to disable tamper protection for Sophos antivirus named SAVEnabled. |
reg.exe add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetServicesSophos Endpoint * DefenseTamperProtectionConfig" /t REG_DWORD /v SEDEnabled /d 0 /f |
Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to disable tamper protection for Sophos antivirus named SEDEnabled. |
reg.exe ADD * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREWOW6432NodeSophosSAVServiceTamperProtection /t REG_DWORD /v Enabled /d 0 /f |
Adds/overwrites a new registry value to disable tamper protection for a Sophos antivirus service called SAVService. |
reg.exe copy hklmsystemCurrentControlSetservicestvnserver * hklmsystemCurrentControlSetcontrolsafebootnetworktvnserver /s /f |
Copies the configuration settings for the tvnserver service to a new location in the registry that will be used when the computer boots into Safe Mode with Networking. This allows the service to run with the same settings in Safe Mode as it does in normal mode. |
s.exe /threads:50 /ldap:all /verbose /outfile:c:users |
Executes SharpShares. |
schtasks.exe /RU SYSTEM /create /sc ONCE / |
Creates a Scheduled Task run as SYSTEM at 0443 AM. When the task is run, cmd.exe uses crundll32.exe to run the DLL file netsh.dll. (It is likely that netsh.dll is a malware file and not associated with netsh.) |
start-process PowerShell.exe -arg C:UsersPublicMusic |
Executes a PowerShell script, while keeping the PowerShell window hidden from the user. |
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and ACSC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or ACSC.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides the top Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) used since 2020 by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors as assessed by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks.
This joint CSA builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
NSA, CISA, and FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A to increase their defensive posture and reduce the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors.
For more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage, FBI’s Industry Alerts, and NSA’s Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 409 KB
NSA, CISA, and FBI continue to assess PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as being one of the largest and most dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to target government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques—some of which pose a significant risk to Information Technology Sector organizations (including telecommunications providers), Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations, and other critical infrastructure organizations.
PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target networks of interest. NSA, CISA, and FBI assess PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have actively targeted U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. See Table 1 for the top used CVEs.
Table I: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020
Vendor |
CVE |
Vulnerability Type |
Apache Log4j |
CVE-2021-44228 |
Remote Code Execution |
Pulse Connect Secure |
CVE-2019-11510 |
Arbitrary File Read |
GitLab CE/EE |
CVE-2021-22205 |
Remote Code Execution |
Atlassian |
CVE-2022-26134 |
Remote Code Execution |
Microsoft Exchange |
CVE-2021-26855 |
Remote Code Execution |
F5 Big-IP |
CVE-2020-5902 |
Remote Code Execution |
VMware vCenter Server |
CVE-2021-22005 |
Arbitrary File Upload |
Citrix ADC |
CVE-2019-19781 |
Path Traversal |
Cisco Hyperflex |
CVE-2021-1497 |
Command Line Execution |
Buffalo WSR |
CVE-2021-20090 |
Relative Path Traversal |
Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center |
CVE-2021-26084 |
Remote Code Execution |
Hikvision Webserver |
CVE-2021-36260 |
Command Injection |
Sitecore XP |
CVE-2021-42237 |
Remote Code Execution |
F5 Big-IP |
CVE-2022-1388 |
Remote Code Execution |
Apache |
CVE-2022-24112 |
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing |
ZOHO |
CVE-2021-40539 |
Remote Code Execution |
Microsoft |
CVE-2021-26857 |
Remote Code Execution |
Microsoft |
CVE-2021-26858 |
Remote Code Execution |
Microsoft |
CVE-2021-27065 |
Remote Code Execution |
Apache HTTP Server |
CVE-2021-41773 |
Path Traversal |
These state-sponsored actors continue to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obfuscate their activities and target web-facing applications to establish initial access. Many of the CVEs indicated in Table 1 allow the actors to surreptitiously gain unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they seek to establish persistence and move laterally to other internally connected networks. For additional information on PRC state-sponsored cyber actors targeting network devices, please see People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices.
NSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to apply the recommendations below and those listed in Appendix A.
Table II: Apache CVE-2021-44228
Apache CVE-2021-44228 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against malicious actor controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. A malicious actor who can control log messages or log message parameters could execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions There are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, check https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228. |
Table III: Pulse CVE-2019-11510
Pulse CVE-2019-11510 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote malicious actor could send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 |
Table IV: GitLab CVE-2021-22205
GitLab CVE-2021-22205 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files passed to a file parser, which resulted in a remote command execution. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Gitlab CE/EE. |
Table V: Atlassian CVE-2022-26134
Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and 7.18.0 before 7.18.1. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions All supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center Confluence Server and Data Center versions after 1.3.0 |
Table VI: Microsoft CVE-2021-26855
Microsoft CVE-2021-26855 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description Microsoft has released security updates for Windows Exchange Server. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an authenticated malicious actor could send malicious requests to an affected server. A malicious actor who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities would execute arbitrary code and compromise the affected systems. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities could allow an adversary to obtain access to sensitive information, bypass security restrictions, cause a denial of service conditions, and/or perform unauthorized actions on the affected Exchange server, which could aid in further malicious activity. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. |
Table VII: F5 CVE-2020-5902
F5 CVE-2020-5902 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions F5 Big-IP Access Policy Manager F5 Big-IP Advanced Firewall Manager F5 Big-IP Advanced Web Application Firewall F5 Big-IP Analytics F5 Big-IP Application Acceleration Manager F5 Big-IP Application Security Manager F5 Big-IP Ddos Hybrid Defender F5 Big-IP Domain Name System (DNS) F5 Big-IP Fraud Protection Service (FPS) F5 Big-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM) F5 Big-IP Link Controller F5 Networks Big-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM) F5 Big-IP Policy Enforcement Manager (PEM) F5 SSL Orchestrator |
References https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K00091341 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K07051153 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K20346072 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K31301245 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K33023560 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43638305 |
Table VIII: VMware CVE-2021-22005
VMware CVE-2021-22005 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description The vCenter Server contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Analytics service. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 on vCenter Server may exploit this issue to execute code on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions VMware Cloud Foundation VMware VCenter Server |
Table IX: Citrix CVE-2019-19781
Citrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP |
Table X: Cisco CVE-2021-1497
Cisco CVE-2021-1497 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote malicious actor to perform a command injection against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Technical details section of this advisory. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Cisco Hyperflex Hx Data Platform 4.0(2A) |
Table XI: Buffalo CVE-2021-20090
Buffalo CVE-2021-20090 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description A path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhpl2-Bk Firmware Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhp3-Bk Firmware |
Table XII: Atlassian CVE-2021-26084
Atlassian CVE-2021-26084 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23 and from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Atlassian Confluence Atlassian Confluence Server Atlassian Data Center Atlassian Jira Data Center |
Table XIII: Hikvision CVE-2021-36260
Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A command injection vulnerability exists in the web server of some Hikvision products. Due to the insufficient input validation, a malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability to launch a command injection by sending some messages with malicious commands. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Various Hikvision Firmware to include Ds, Ids, and Ptz |
References |
Table XIV: Sitecore CVE-2021-42237
Sitecore CVE-2021-42237 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description Sitecore XP 7.5 Initial Release to Sitecore XP 8.2 Update-7 is vulnerable to an insecure deserialization attack where it is possible to achieve remote command execution on the machine. No authentication or special configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Sitecore Experience Platform 7.5, 7.5 Update 1, and 7.5 Update 2 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0, 8.0 Service Pack 1, and 8.0 Update 1-Update 7 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0 Service Pack 1 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.1, and Update 1-Update 3 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.2, and Update 1-Update 7 |
Table XV: F5 CVE-2022-1388
F5 CVE-2022-1388 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Big IP versions: 16.1.0-16.1.2 15.1.0-15.1.5 14.1.0-14.1.4 13.1.0-13.1.4 12.1.0-12.1.6 11.6.1-11.6.5 |
Table XVI: Apache CVE-2022-24112
Apache CVE-2022-24112 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description A malicious actor can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX's data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods N/A |
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Apache APISIX between 1.3 and 2.12.1 (excluding 2.12.1) LTS versions of Apache APISIX between 2.10.0 and 2.10.4 |
Table XVII: ZOHO CVE-2021-40539
ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) |
Vulnerability Description Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior is vulnerable to REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Zoho Corp ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus |
Table XVIII: Microsoft CVE-2021-26857
Microsoft CVE-2021-26857 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) |
Vulnerability Description Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange Servers |
Table XIX: Microsoft CVE-2021-26858
Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) |
Vulnerability Description Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange Servers |
Table XX: Microsoft CVE-2021-27065
Microsoft CVE-2021-27065 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) |
Vulnerability Description Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange Servers |
References https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27065 |
Table XXI: Apache CVE-2021-41773
Apache CVE-2021-41773 CVSS 3.0: 7.5 (High) |
Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A flaw was found in a change made to path normalization in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49. A malicious actor could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the directories configured by Alias-like directives. If files outside of these directories are not protected by the usual default configuration "require all denied," these requests can succeed. Enabling CGI scripts for these aliased paths could allow for remote code execution. This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions. The fix in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 is incomplete (see CVE-2021-42013). |
Recommended Mitigations
|
Detection Methods
|
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and 2.4.50 Fedoraproject Fedora 34 and 35 Oracle Instantis Enterprise Track 17.1-17.3 Netapp Cloud Backup |
Initial Publication: October 6, 2022
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released.
• Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to provide information on the “Daixin Team,” a cybercrime group that is actively targeting U.S. businesses, predominantly in the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector, with ransomware and data extortion operations.
This joint CSA provides TTPs and IOCs of Daixin actors obtained from FBI threat response activities and third-party reporting.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 591 KB
Download the IOCs: .stix 23.2 kb
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
Cybercrime actors routinely target HPH Sector organizations with ransomware:
The Daixin Team is a ransomware and data extortion group that has targeted the HPH Sector with ransomware and data extortion operations since at least June 2022. Since then, Daixin Team cybercrime actors have caused ransomware incidents at multiple HPH Sector organizations where they have:
Daixin actors gain initial access to victims through virtual private network (VPN) servers. In one confirmed compromise, the actors likely exploited an unpatched vulnerability in the organization’s VPN server [T1190]. In another confirmed compromise, the actors used previously compromised credentials to access a legacy VPN server [T1078] that did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled. The actors are believed to have acquired the VPN credentials through the use of a phishing email with a malicious attachment [T1598.002].
After obtaining access to the victim’s VPN server, Daixin actors move laterally via Secure Shell (SSH) [T1563.001] and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [T1563.002]. Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping [T1003] and pass the hash [T1550.002]. The actors have leveraged privileged accounts to gain access to VMware vCenter Server and reset account passwords [T1098] for ESXi servers in the environment. The actors have then used SSH to connect to accessible ESXi servers and deploy ransomware [T1486] on those servers.
According to third-party reporting, the Daixin Team’s ransomware is based on leaked Babuk Locker source code. This third-party reporting as well as FBI analysis show that the ransomware targets ESXi servers and encrypts files located in /vmfs/volumes/
with the following extensions: .vmdk
, .vmem
, .vswp
, .vmsd
, .vmx
, and .vmsn
. A ransom note is also written to /vmfs/volumes/
. See Figure 1 for targeted file system path and Figure 2 for targeted file extensions list. Figure 3
and Figure 4
include examples of ransom notes. Note that in the Figure 3 ransom note, Daixin actors misspell “Daixin” as “Daxin.”
Figure 1: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Path
Figure 2: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Extensions
Figure 3: Example 1 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note
Figure 4: Example 2 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note
In addition to deploying ransomware, Daixin actors have exfiltrated data [TA0010] from victim systems. In one confirmed compromise, the actors used Rclone—an open-source program to manage files on cloud storage—to exfiltrate data to a dedicated virtual private server (VPS). In another compromise, the actors used Ngrok—a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain—for data exfiltration [T1567].
See Table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques included in this advisory.
Table 1: Daixin Actors’ ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise
Reconnaissance |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Attachment |
Daixin actors have acquired the VPN credentials (later used for initial access) by a phishing email with a malicious attachment. |
|
Initial Access |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Daixin actors exploited an unpatched vulnerability in a VPN server to gain initial access to a network. |
|
Valid Accounts |
Daixin actors use previously compromised credentials to access servers on the target network. |
|
Persistence |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Account Manipulation |
Daixin actors have leveraged privileged accounts to reset account passwords for VMware ESXi servers in the compromised environment. |
|
Credential Access |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
OS Credential Dumping |
Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping. |
|
Lateral Movement |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Remote Service Session Hijacking: SSH Hijacking |
Daixin actors use SSH and RDP to move laterally across a network. |
|
Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking |
Daixin actors use RDP to move laterally across a network. |
|
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash |
Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through pass the hash. |
|
Exfiltration |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Exfiltration Over Web Service |
Daixin Team members have used Ngrok for data exfiltration over web servers. |
|
Impact |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Data Encrypted for Impact |
Daixin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. |
See Table 2 for IOCs obtained from third-party reporting.
Table 2: Daixin Team IOCs – Rclone Associated SHA256 Hashes
File |
SHA256 |
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64git-log.txt |
9E42E07073E03BDEA4CD978D9E7B44A9574972818593306BE1F3DCFDEE722238 |
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64rclone.1 |
19ED36F063221E161D740651E6578D50E0D3CACEE89D27A6EBED4AB4272585BD |
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64rclone.exe |
54E3B5A2521A84741DC15810E6FED9D739EB8083CB1FE097CB98B345AF24E939 |
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64README.html |
EC16E2DE3A55772F5DFAC8BF8F5A365600FAD40A244A574CBAB987515AA40CBF |
rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64README.txt |
475D6E80CF4EF70926A65DF5551F59E35B71A0E92F0FE4DD28559A9DEBA60C28 |
FBI, CISA, and HHS urge HPH Sector organizations to implement the following to protect against Daixin and related malicious activity:
If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:
Note: FBI, CISA, and HHS strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Daixin Group actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at cisa.gov/report.
FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank CrowdStrike and the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Health-ISAC) for their contributions to this CSA.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.
Initial Publication: October 21, 2022
From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.
CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.
CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities. If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts. All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.
For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb.
For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.
In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network. CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers. In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity. Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address 51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server. Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell. Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address. CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.
CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise. As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from 51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC.
From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software. The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.
In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server. As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address 182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds.
The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender [T1562.001]:
powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:'; Write-Host 'added-exclusion'} catch {Write-Host 'adding-exclusion-failed' }; powershell -enc "$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it"
The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:drive without virus scans. The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:userspublicmde.ps1 [T1105]. When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004].
file.zip contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.
See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.
After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount [T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host. Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153. The actors downloaded the following tools:
The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account [T1136.002]. Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network. Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files. The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot. The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to tunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse). It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com, *.ngrok[.]io, ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com, or korgn.*.lennut[.]com.
Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]:
Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address >
The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account [T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed.
See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.
Initial Access |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
Exploit Public-Facing Application |
The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server. |
Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050]. Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches [M1016],[M1051]. |
|
Execution |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendation |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain. |
Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045]. Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049]. |
|
Persistence |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
Account Manipulation |
The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts. |
Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032]. Detection: Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002]. |
|
Create Account: Local Account |
The actors’ malware can create local user accounts. |
Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create [DS0017]. Detection: Enable logging for new user creation [DS0002]. |
|
Create Account: Domain Account |
The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account. |
Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. Detection: Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts [DS0002]. |
|
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM. |
Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM [M1028]. Detection: Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009] Detection: Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service [DS0003]. |
|
Valid Accounts: Default Accounts |
The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount. |
Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027]. Detection: Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028]. |
|
Defense Evasion |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
|
The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The tool allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:drive. The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI. |
Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. [M1018]. Detection: Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:SOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows Defender [DS0024]. Detection: Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013]. Detection: Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009]. |
|
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion |
The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis. |
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017]. Detection: Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022]. |
|
Credential Access |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process. |
Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043] Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040]. Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027]. Detection: Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe. Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. [DS0009]. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS [DS0017]. |
|
Credentials from Password Stores |
The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials. |
Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027]. Detection: Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009]. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017]. |
|
Discovery |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
Remote System Discovery |
The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain. |
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017]. Detection: Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029]. Detection: Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009]. |
|
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery |
The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8. |
Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping) [DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems. |
|
Lateral Movement |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
The actors used RDP to move laterally to multiple hosts on the network. |
Mitigation: Use MFA for remote logins [M1032]. Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042]. Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030]. Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP [M1026]. Detection: Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028]. |
|
Command and Control |
|||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Recommendations |
Proxy |
The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control. |
Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists [M1037]. Detection: Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure) [DS0029]. |
|
Ingress Tool Transfer |
The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok. |
Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].
|
If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC.
CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching.
CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization's cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
Initial Version: November 16, 2022
Actions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords
• Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.
FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information. Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks. From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).
The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network. Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133]. In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812. This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.
Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]:
After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to:
Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112].
Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz [T1537]. In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.
During the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.*) is created in the root directory (C: or /root/). Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced. The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486]. The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files. However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.
The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below). Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).
https://mega[.]nz |
https://send.exploit[.]in |
https://ufile[.]io |
https://www.sendspace[.]com |
https://privatlab[.]net |
https://privatlab[.]com |
Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline. Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars. Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.
Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.
Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises. Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.
Known IOCs - Files |
HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files |
*.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C: or /root |
hive.bat |
shadow.bat |
asq.r77vh0[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file |
asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw - Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution |
asq.swhw71un[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file |
asd.s7610rir[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file |
Windows_x64_encrypt.dll |
Windows_x64_encrypt.exe |
Windows_x32_encrypt.dll |
Windows_x32_encrypt.exe |
Linux_encrypt |
Esxi_encrypt |
Known IOCs – Events |
System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped |
Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled |
Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled |
Volume shadow copies deleted |
Normal boot process prevented |
Known IOCs – Logged Processes |
wevtutil.exe cl system |
wevtutil.exe cl security |
wevtutil.exe cl application |
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet |
wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive |
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete |
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures |
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no |
84.32.188[.]57 |
84.32.188[.]238 |
93.115.26[.]251 |
185.8.105[.]67 |
181.231.81[.]239 |
185.8.105[.]112 |
186.111.136[.]37 |
192.53.123[.]202 |
158.69.36[.]149 |
46.166.161[.]123 |
108.62.118[.]190 |
46.166.161[.]93 |
185.247.71[.]106 |
46.166.162[.]125 |
5.61.37[.]207 |
46.166.162[.]96 |
185.8.105[.]103 |
46.166.169[.]34 |
5.199.162[.]220 |
93.115.25[.]139 |
5.199.162[.]229 |
93.115.27[.]148 |
89.147.109[.]208 |
83.97.20[.]81 |
5.61.37[.]207 |
5.199.162[.]220 |
5.199.162[.]229; |
46.166.161[.]93 |
46.166.161[.]123; |
46.166.162[.]96 |
46.166.162[.]125 |
46.166.169[.]34 |
83.97.20[.]81 |
84.32.188[.]238 |
84.32.188[.]57 |
89.147.109[.]208 |
93.115.25[.]139; |
93.115.26[.]251 |
93.115.27[.]148 |
108.62.118[.]190 |
158.69.36[.]149/span> |
181.231.81[.]239 |
185.8.105[.]67 |
185.8.105[.]103 |
185.8.105[.]112 |
185.247.71[.]106 |
186.111.136[.]37 |
192.53.123[.]202 |
See table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory.
Initial Access |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
External Remote Services |
Hive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols. |
|
Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321. |
|
Phishing |
Hive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments. |
|
Execution |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Command and Scripting Interpreter |
Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell. |
|
Defense Evasion |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Indicator Removal on Host |
Hive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs. |
|
Modify Registry |
Hive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1. |
|
Impair Defenses |
Hive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption. |
|
Exfiltration |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
Hive actors exfiltrate data from victims, using a possible combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz. |
|
Impact |
||
Technique Title |
|
Use |
Data Encrypted for Impact |
Hive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered. |
|
Inhibit System Recovery |
Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell. |
FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware:
If your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions.
In addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.
Vulnerability and Configuration Management
The FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered. However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks.
The FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including:
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.
Initial Version: November 17, 2022
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba.
Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase.
This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors.
FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:
As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors:
After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through Hancitor—a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’ networks.
Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from victims.[1],[2]
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2] Cuba ransomware actors have:
According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, “leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called ApcHelper.sys. This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak." [T1562.001].[2]
In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2]
Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors:
RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3][4] The actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001], which allowed the RomCom actors to:
See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible exploitation or compromise.
Note: For IOCs as of early November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
File Name |
File Path |
File Hash |
netping.dll |
c:windowstemp |
SHA256: f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c |
shar.bat |
|
MD5: 4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca SHA256: a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c |
Psexesvc.exe |
|
SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944 |
1.bat |
|
|
216155s.dll |
|
|
23246s.bat |
|
SHA256: 02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8 |
23246s.dll |
|
SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f |
23246st.dll |
|
SHA256: f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710 |
259238e.exe |
|
|
31-100.bat |
|
|
3184.bat |
|
|
3184.dll |
|
|
45.dll |
|
SHA256: 857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583 |
4ca736d.exe |
|
|
62e2e37.exe |
|
|
64.235.39.82 |
|
|
64s.dll |
|
|
7z.sfx |
|
|
7zCon.sfx |
|
|
7-zip.chm |
|
|
82.ps1 |
|
|
9479.bat |
|
SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0 |
9479p.bat |
|
SHA256: f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a |
9479p.ps1 |
|
SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17 |
a.exe
|
|
MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3
SHA1: eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4
SHA256: 0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3
SHA256: 0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605
SHA256: 7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c
SHA256: af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02 |
a220.bat |
|
|
a220.dll |
|
SHA256: 8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3 |
a82.exe |
|
SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42 |
a91.exe |
|
SHA256: 3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce |
a99.exe |
|
SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b |
aa.exe |
|
|
aa2.exe |
|
|
aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com |
|
|
add2.exe |
|
|
advapi32.dll |
|
|
agent.13.ps1 |
|
|
agent.bat |
|
SHA256: fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975 |
agent.dll |
|
|
agent13.bat |
|
|
agent13.ps1 |
|
SHA256: 1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b |
agent64.bin |
|
SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1 |
agsyst121.bat |
|
|
agsyst121.dll |
|
|
all.bat |
|
SHA256: ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a |
all.dll |
|
SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4 |
anet.exe |
|
SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3
SHA256: 74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84
SHA256: b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53 SHA256: f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae |
App.exe |
|
|
appnetwork.exe |
|
|
AppVClient.man |
|
|
aswSP_arPot2 |
|
|
aus.exe |
|
SHA256: 0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444cf674 SHA256: 310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b136ba |
av.bat |
|
SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e7f773b8 |
c2.ps1 |
|
|
c2.ps1 |
|
|
cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx |
|
|
check.exe |
|
|
checkk.exe |
|
|
checkk.txt |
|
SHA256: 1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec552266bec9f |
client32.exe |
|
|
comctl32 .dll |
|
|
comp2.ps1 |
|
|
comps2.ps1 |
|
|
cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx |
|
|
defendercontrol.exe |
|
|
ff.exe |
|
SHA256: 1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652fc834 |
File __agsyst121.dll |
|
|
File __aswArPot.sys |
|
|
File __s9239.dll |
|
|
File_agsyst121.dll |
|
|
File_aswArPot.sys |
|
|
File_s9239.dll |
|
|
ga.exe |
|
|
gdi32 .dll |
|
|
geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx |
|
|
IObit UNLOCKER.exe |
|
|
kavsa32.exe |
|
MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b SHA1: 9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722 |
kavsyst32.exe |
|
|
kernel32.dll |
|
|
komar.bat |
|
SHA256: B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FBC715197BB |
komar.dll |
|
|
komar121.bat |
|
|
komar121.dll |
|
|
komar2.ps1 |
|
SHA256: 61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f0f7cc4 |
komar64.dll |
|
SHA256: 8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF1367125797B6036B |
mfcappk32.exe |
|
|
newpass.ps1 |
|
SHA256: c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2dcc427 |
npalll.exe |
|
SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361978906 |
ole32.dll |
|
|
oleaut32.dll |
|
|
open.bat |
|
SHA256: 2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8FE482676 |
open.exe |
|
|
pass.ps1 |
|
SHA256: 0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d767666 |
pdfdecrypt.exe |
|
|
powerview.ps1 |
|
|
prt3389.bat |
|
SHA256: e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010dec72ed |
ra.ps1 |
|
SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f18a4ad8 |
rg1.exe |
|
|
Rg2.exe |
|
|
rundll32 |
|
|
s64174.bat |
|
SHA256: 10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cbec510a2 SHA256: 1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b9b4f79 |
s64174.dll |
|
|
s9239.bat |
|
|
s9239.dll |
|
|
shell32.dll |
|
|
stel.exe |
|
|
syskav64.exe |
|
|
sysra64,exe |
|
|
systav332.bat |
|
SHA256: 01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d09ca74 |
TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe |
|
|
TeamViewer.exe |
|
|
testDLL.dll |
|
|
tug4rigd.dll |
|
SHA256: 952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286b7474 |
UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl |
|
|
user32.dll |
|
|
v1.bat |
|
|
v2.bat |
|
|
v3.bat |
|
|
veeamp.exe |
|
SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732 |
version.dll |
|
|
vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx |
|
|
wininet.dll |
|
|
wlog.exe |
|
|
wpeqawzp.sys |
|
|
y3lcx345.dll |
|
|
zero.exe |
|
SHA256: 3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e211ed0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Email Addresses |
|
Cuba-supp[.]com |
admin@cuba-supp[.]com |
Encryption-support[.]com |
admin@encryption-support[.]com |
Mail.supports24[.]net |
inbox@mail.supports24[.]net |
cuba_support@exploit[.]im |
193.23.244[.]244 |
144.172.83[.]13 |
216.45.55[.]30 |
94.103.9[.]79 |
149.255.35[.]131 |
217.79.43[.]148 |
192.137.101[.]46 |
154.35.175[.]225 |
222.252.53[.]33 |
92.222.172[.]39 |
159.203.70[.]39 |
23.227.198[.]246 |
92.222.172[.]172 |
171.25.193[.]9 |
31.184.192[.]44 |
10.13.102[.]1 |
185.153.199[.]169 |
37.120.247[.]39 |
10.13.102[.]58 |
192.137.100[.]96 |
37.44.253[.]21 |
10.133.78[.]41 |
192.137.100[.]98 |
38.108.119[.]121 |
10.14.100[.]20 |
192.137.101[.]205 |
45.164.21[.]13 |
103.114.163[.]197 |
193.34.167[.]17 |
45.32.229[.]66 |
103.27.203[.]197 |
194.109.206[.]212 |
45.86.162[.]34 |
104.217.8[.]100 |
195.54.160[.]149 |
45.91.83[.]176 |
107.189.10[.]143 |
199.58.81[.]140 |
64.52.169[.]174 |
108.170.31[.]115 |
204.13.164[.]118 |
64.235.39[.]82 |
128.31.0[.]34 |
209.76.253[.]84 |
79.141.169[.]220 |
128.31.0[.]39 |
212.192.241[.]230 |
84.17.52[.]135 |
131.188.40[.]189 |
213.32.39[.]43 |
86.59.21[.]38 |
141.98.87[.]124 |
216.45.55[.]3 |
|
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x |
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z |
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t |
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83 |
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl |
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza |
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus |
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh |
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah |
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx |
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr |
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h |
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv |
bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y |
bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x |
bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3 |
bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7 |
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc |
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x |
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z |
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t |
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83 |
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl |
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza |
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus |
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh |
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah |
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx |
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr |
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h |
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv |
See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note.
Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were compromised. All your files were encrypted and you can’t restore them without our private key. Trying to restore it without our help may cause complete loss of your data. Also we researched whole your corporate network and downloaded all your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact from you in the next 3 days we will public it in our news site. You can find it there ( https[:]// cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ ) Tor Browser is needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ ) Also we respect your work and time and we are open for communication. In that case we are ready to discuss recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and compliance with agreements by our side. Also we can provide all necessary evidence to confirm performance of our products and statements. Feel free to contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html )
Our ToxID: 37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271
Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net
Mark your messages with your personal ID:
|
Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise:
Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table, see FBI Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Resource Development |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Compromise Infrastructure: Domains |
Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct their operations. |
|
Initial Access |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Valid Accounts |
Cuba ransomware actors have been known to use compromised credentials to get into a victim’s network. |
|
External Remote Services |
Cuba ransomware actors may leverage external-facing remote services to gain initial access to a victim’s network. |
|
Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Cuba ransomware actors are known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing systems. |
|
Phishing |
Cuba ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain initial access to systems. |
|
Execution |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate privileges. |
|
Software Deployment Tools |
Cuba ransomware actors use Hancitor as a tool to spread malicious files throughout a victim’s network. |
|
Privilege Escalation |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain administrator privileges.[2] |
|
Defense Evasion |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a loader that disables security tools within the victim network. |
|
Lateral Movement |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Remote Services Session: RDP Hijacking |
Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally. |
|
Credential Access |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored compromised credentials. |
|
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting |
Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to identify service accounts linked to active directory.[2] |
|
Command and Control |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Proxy: Manipulate Command and Control Communications |
Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2] |
FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware:
FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA.
FBI and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their contributions to this CSA.
December 1, 2022: Initial Version|December 12, 2022: Added new IP addresses and IOCs
Actions Critical Infrastructure Organizations Should Implement to Immediately Strengthen Their Cyber Posture.
• Patch all systems. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Implement multi-factor authentication.
• Use antivirus software.
• Develop internal contact lists and surge support.
Note: this advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework, version 10. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)—authored by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA)—is part of our continuing cybersecurity mission to warn organizations of cyber threats and help the cybersecurity community reduce the risk presented by these threats. This CSA provides an overview of Russian state-sponsored cyber operations; commonly observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); detection actions; incident response guidance; and mitigations. This overview is intended to help the cybersecurity community reduce the risk presented by these threats.
CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage the cybersecurity community—especially critical infrastructure network defenders—to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive threat hunting, as outlined in the Detection section. Additionally, CISA, the FBI, and NSA strongly urge network defenders to implement the recommendations listed below and detailed in the Mitigations section. These mitigations will help organizations improve their functional resilience by reducing the risk of compromise or severe business degradation.
CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage critical infrastructure organization leaders to review CISA Insights: Preparing for and Mitigating Cyber Threats for information on reducing cyber threats to their organization.
Click here for a PDF version of this report.
Historically, Russian state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors have used common but effective tactics—including spearphishing, brute force, and exploiting known vulnerabilities against accounts and networks with weak security—to gain initial access to target networks. Vulnerabilities known to be exploited by Russian state-sponsored APT actors for initial access include:
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or developing and deploying custom malware. The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments—including cloud environments—by using legitimate credentials.
In some cases, Russian state-sponsored cyber operations against critical infrastructure organizations have specifically targeted operational technology (OT)/industrial control systems (ICS) networks with destructive malware. See the following advisories and alerts for information on historical Russian state-sponsored cyber-intrusion campaigns and customized malware that have targeted ICS:
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used sophisticated cyber capabilities to target a variety of U.S. and international critical infrastructure organizations, including those in the Defense Industrial Base as well as the Healthcare and Public Health, Energy, Telecommunications, and Government Facilities Sectors. High-profile cyber activity publicly attributed to Russian state-sponsored APT actors by U.S. government reporting and legal actions includes:
For more information on recent and historical Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see the referenced products below or cisa.gov/Russia.
Table 1 provides common, publicly known TTPs employed by Russian state-sponsored APT actors, which map to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 10. Note: these lists are not intended to be all inclusive. Russian state-sponsored actors have modified their TTPs before based on public reporting.[1] Therefore, CISA, the FBI, and NSA anticipate the Russian state-sponsored actors may modify their TTPs as they deem necessary to reduce their risk of detection.
Table 1: Common Tactics and Techniques Employed by Russian State-Sponsored APT Actors
Tactic | Technique | Procedure |
---|---|---|
Reconnaissance [TA0043] |
Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning [T1595.002] |
|
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. |
||
Phishing for Information [T1598] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted spearphishing campaigns to gain credentials of target networks. |
|
Resource Development [TA0042] |
Develop Capabilities: Malware [T1587.001] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have developed and deployed malware, including ICS-focused destructive malware. |
Initial Access [TA0001] |
Exploit Public Facing Applications [T1190] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors use publicly known vulnerabilities, as well as zero-days, in internet-facing systems to gain access to networks. |
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain [T1195.002] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have gained initial access to victim organizations by compromising trusted third-party software. Notable incidents include M.E.Doc accounting software and SolarWinds Orion. |
|
Execution [TA0002] |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell [T1059.003] and Windows Command Shell [T1059.003] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used |
Persistence [TA0003] |
Valid Accounts [T1078] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used credentials of existing accounts to maintain persistent, long-term access to compromised networks. |
Credential Access [TA0006] |
Brute Force: Password Guessing [T1110.001] and Password Spraying [T1110.003] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted brute-force password guessing and password spraying campaigns. |
OS Credential Dumping: NTDS [T1003.003] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exfiltrated credentials and exported copies of the Active Directory database |
|
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting [T1558.003] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have performed “Kerberoasting,” whereby they obtained the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Tickets for Active Directory Service Principal Names (SPN) for offline cracking. |
|
Credentials from Password Stores [T1555] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used previously compromised account credentials to attempt to access Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords. |
|
Exploitation for Credential Access [T1212] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows Netlogon vulnerability CVE-2020-1472 to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers. |
|
Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys [T1552.004] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates. |
|
Command and Control [TA0011] |
Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy [T1090.003] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to hide activity among legitimate user traffic. |
For additional enterprise TTPs used by Russian state-sponsored APT actors, see the ATT&CK for Enterprise pages on APT29, APT28, and the Sandworm Team, respectively. For information on ICS TTPs see the ATT&CK for ICS pages on the Sandworm Team, BlackEnergy 3 malware, CrashOveride malware, BlackEnergy’s KillDisk component, and NotPetya malware.
Given Russian state-sponsored APT actors demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise and cloud environments, CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all critical infrastructure organizations to:
ntds.dit
file from a domain controller. Organizations detecting potential APT activity in their IT or OT networks should:
Note: for OT assets, organizations should have a resilience plan that addresses how to operate if you lose access to—or control of—the IT and/or OT environment. Refer to the Mitigations section for more information.
See the joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for guidance on hunting or investigating a network, and for common mistakes in incident handling. CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to see CISA’s Federal Government Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks. Although tailored to federal civilian branch agencies, these playbooks provide operational procedures for planning and conducting cybersecurity incident and vulnerability response activities and detail each step for both incident and vulnerability response.
Note: organizations should document incident response procedures in a cyber incident response plan, which organizations should create and exercise (as noted in the Mitigations section).
CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all organizations to implement the following recommendations to increase their cyber resilience against this threat.
CISA, the FBI, and NSA recommend organizations apply the best practices below for identity and access management, protective controls and architecture, and vulnerability and configuration management.
Note: CISA, the FBI, and NSA also recommend, as a longer-term effort, that critical infrastructure organizations implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Network segmentation can help prevent lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks.
If you have information on state-sponsored Russian cyber operations targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, contact the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program. You may be eligible for a reward of up to $10 million, which DOS is offering for information leading to the identification or location of any person who, while acting under the direction or control of a foreign government, participates in malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Contact +1-202-702-7843 on WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram, or send information via the Rewards for Justice secure Tor-based tips line located on the Dark Web. For more details refer to rewardsforjustice.net/malicious_cyber_activity.
The information you have accessed or received is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, and NSA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, or NSA.
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the Computer Emergency Response Team New Zealand (CERT NZ), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide mitigation guidance on addressing vulnerabilities in Apache’s Log4j software library: CVE-2021-44228 (known as “Log4Shell”), CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021-45105. Sophisticated cyber threat actors are actively scanning networks to potentially exploit Log4Shell, CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021-45105 in vulnerable systems. According to public reporting, Log4Shell and CVE-2021-45046 are being actively exploited.
CISA, in collaboration with industry members of CISA’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), previously published guidance on Log4Shell for vendors and affected organizations in which CISA recommended that affected organizations immediately apply appropriate patches (or apply workarounds if unable to upgrade), conduct a security review, and report compromises to CISA or the FBI. CISA also issued an Emergency Directive directing U.S. federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agencies to immediately mitigate Log4j vulnerabilities in solution stacks that accept data from the internet. This joint CSA expands on the previously published guidance by detailing steps that vendors and organizations with IT and/or cloud assets should take to reduce the risk posed by these vulnerabilities.
These steps include:
This CSA also provides guidance for affected organizations with operational technology (OT)/industrial control systems (ICS) assets.
Log4j is a Java-based logging library used in a variety of consumer and enterprise services, websites, applications, and OT products. These vulnerabilities, especially Log4Shell, are severe—Apache has rated Log4Shell and CVE-2021-45046 as critical and CVE-2021-45105 as high on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). These vulnerabilities are likely to be exploited over an extended period. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK strongly urge all organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section.
CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK encourage leaders of organizations to review NCSC-UK’s blog post, Log4j vulnerability: what should boards be asking?, for information on Log4Shell’s possible impact on their organization as well as response recommendations.
Note: this is an evolving situation, and new vulnerabilities are being discovered. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK will update this CSA as we learn more about this exploitation and have further guidance to impart.
Click here for a PDF version of this report.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, or NCSC-UK.
Log4Shell, disclosed on December 10, 2021, is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Apache’s Log4j library, versions 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1. The vulnerability exists in the action the Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) takes to resolve variables. Affected versions of Log4j contain JNDI features—such as message lookup substitution—that do not protect against adversary-controlled Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Domain Name System (DNS), and other JNDI-related endpoints.
An adversary can exploit Log4Shell by submitting a specially crafted request to a vulnerable system that causes that system to execute arbitrary code. The request allows the adversary to take full control over the system. The adversary can then steal information, launch ransomware, or conduct other malicious activity.
CVE-2021-45046, disclosed on December 13, 2021, enables a remote attacker to cause RCE, a denial-of-service (DoS) condition, or other effects in certain non-default configurations. This vulnerability affects all versions of Log4j from 2.0-beta9 through 2.12.1 and 2.13.0 through 2.15.0. In response, Apache released Log4j version 2.16.0 (Java 8).
CVE-2021-45105, disclosed on December 16, 2021, enables a remote attacker to cause a DoS condition or other effects in certain non-default configurations. According to Apache, when the logging configuration uses a non-default Pattern Layout with a Context Lookup (for example, $${ctx:loginId}
), attackers with control over Thread Context Map (MDC) input data can craft malicious input data that contains a recursive lookup, resulting in a StackOverflowError
that will terminate the process. In response, Apache released Log4j version 2.17.0 (Java 8).
Log4Shell and CVE-2021-45046—rated as critical vulnerabilities by Apache—are severe because Java is used extensively across IT and OT platforms, they are easy to exploit, and applying mitigations is resource intensive. Log4Shell is especially critical because it allows malicious actors to remotely run code on vulnerable networks and take full control of systems.
According to public reporting, exploitation of Log4Shell began on or around December 1, 2021, and a proof-of-concept exploit is publicly available for this vulnerability. The FBI has observed attempted exploitation and widespread scanning of the Log4j vulnerability to gain access to networks to deploy cryptomining and botnet malware. The FBI assesses this vulnerability may be exploited by sophisticated cyber threat actors and incorporated into existing cyber criminal schemes that are looking to adopt increasingly sophisticated obfuscation techniques. According to public reporting, CVE-2021-45046 is being actively exploited as well.
CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK assess that exploitation of these vulnerabilities, especially Log4Shell, is likely to increase and continue over an extended period. Given the severity of the vulnerabilities and likely increased exploitation, CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK strongly urge all organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section to identify, mitigate, and update affected assets.
For more information on these vulnerabilities, see the Apache Log4j Security Vulnerabilities webpage.
CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK encourage vendors to:
CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK recommend that affected organizations take the following steps to patch these vulnerabilities in their IT and cloud assets and initiate threat hunting to detect possible compromise. Organizations with OT/ICS environments should review the Organizations with OT/ICS Assets section for additional guidance. Note: this guidance includes resources that may or may not be possible for all organizations. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK recommend that organizations apply the mitigations listed in this advisory to the extent allowed by their environments.
1. Identify vulnerable assets in your environment.
Knowing where Log4j and other affected products exist in your environment is key for protecting your networks.
Additional resources for detecting vulnerable instances of Log4j are identified below. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK will update the sources for detection rules as we obtain them. Note: due to the urgency to share this information, CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK have not yet validated this content.
2. Mitigate known and suspected vulnerable assets in your environment.
A. Treat known and suspected vulnerable assets as compromised. These assets should be isolated until they are mitigated and verified (step 2.D). The method of isolation that you should use depends on the criticality of the asset. Possible isolation methods include:
B. Patch Log4j and other affected products to the latest version.
Note: if your organization is unable to immediately identify and patch vulnerable instances of Log4j, apply appropriate workarounds. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK recommend using vendor-provided mitigations when available. Due to the rapidly evolving situation, these workarounds should not be considered permanent fixes and organizations should apply the appropriate patch as soon as it is made available. Additional mitigations are identified below; however, organizations should use these mitigations at their own risk as they may be incomplete, temporary, or cause harmful effects, such as application instability, a DoS condition, or log evasion.
Jndilookup.class
from the class path. [1]Jndilookup.class
. Note: removal of the JndiManager
will cause the JndiContextSelector
and JMSAppender
to no longer function). [2]C. Keep an inventory of known and suspected vulnerable assets and what is done with them throughout this process. It is important to track patching because malicious cyber actors may compromise an asset and then patch it to protect their operations. Organizations should keep a meticulous record of vulnerable assets they have patched to identify whether a threat actor may have patched an asset.
D. Verify the mitigation has worked, if possible.
3. Initiate hunt and incident response procedures. Given the widespread exploitation of this vulnerability, CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK encourage all organizations to assume their assets that use Log4j may have been compromised and initiate hunt procedures.
A. Hunt for signs of exploitation and compromise.
Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise are identified below. Note: due to the urgency to share this information, CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK have not yet validated this content.
B. If compromise is detected, organizations should:
4. Evaluate and apply other mitigations.
A. Remain alert to changes from vendors for the software on the asset, and immediately apply updates to assets when notified by a vendor that their product has a patch for this vulnerability. Additionally, see CISA's GitHub repository for known affected products and patch information. CISA will continually update the repository as vendors release patches.
B. Continue to monitor Log4J assets closely. Continually use signatures and indicators of compromise that may indicate exploitation.
C. Continue to monitor the Apache Log4j Security Vulnerabilities webpage for new updates. Note: as this is an evolving situation and new vulnerabilities in Log4J are being discovered, organizations should ensure their Apache Log4j is up to date. Identify the software your enterprise uses and stay on top of updates as these may be superseded by other updates and fixes.
D. Block specific outbound Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) network traffic.
Note: blocking attacker internet IP addresses during this event is difficult due to the high volume of scanning from non-malicious researchers and vendors. The false positives on IP addresses are high. Organizations should focus on looking for signs of successful exploitation and not scans.
Affected Organizations with OT/ICS Assets
Due to the pervasiveness of the Apache Log4j software library—and the integration of the library in operational products—CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK strongly recommend that OT asset owners and operators review their operational architecture and enumerate the vulnerability status against current product alerts and advisories. If a product does not have a security advisory specifically addressing the status of the vulnerability, treat it with additional protections. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK urge patching or deployment of mitigations to reduce the risk of the threat of these vulnerabilities.
Note: CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK recommend prioritizing patching IT devices, especially those with internet connectivity. Affected internet-facing devices as well as laptops, desktops, and tablets are especially susceptible to exploitation of these vulnerabilities. OT/ICS devices—if segmented appropriately from the IT environment—do not face the internet and, as such, have a smaller attack surface to this vulnerability. Exploitation of IT devices may affect OT/ICS devices if there is insufficient network segmentation that prevents lateral movement.
CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK recommend that OT/ICS asset owner/operators take the following guidance into consideration:
When remote access is required, use secure methods such as virtual private networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that a VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK also remind organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov in the Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and consider reporting compromises immediately.
For more information, resources, and general guidance, including resources and mitigation guidance from industry members of JCDC, see CISA’s webpage Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance. Note: due to the prominent and ever evolving nature of this vulnerability, there are multiple unverified published guidance documents that are geared towards Log4j vulnerabilities. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK encourage all organizations to verify information with trusted sources, such CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, CERT NZ, NZ NCSC, NCSC-UK vendors.
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework, Version 9. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise framework for referenced threat actor techniques and for mitigations.
This joint advisory is the result of analytic efforts between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to highlight the cyber threat associated with active exploitation of a newly identified vulnerability (CVE-2021-44077) in Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus—IT help desk software with asset management.
CVE-2021-44077, which Zoho rated critical, is an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting all ServiceDesk Plus versions up to, and including, version 11305. This vulnerability was addressed by the update released by Zoho on September 16, 2021 for ServiceDesk Plus versions 11306 and above. The FBI and CISA assess that advanced persistent threat (APT) cyber actors are among those exploiting the vulnerability. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability allows an attacker to upload executable files and place webshells, which enable the adversary to conduct post-exploitation activities, such as compromising administrator credentials, conducting lateral movement, and exfiltrating registry hives and Active Directory files.
The Zoho update that patched this vulnerability was released on September 16, 2021, along with a security advisory. Additionally, an email advisory was sent to all ServiceDesk Plus customers with additional information. Zoho released a subsequent security advisory on November 22, 2021, and advised customers to patch immediately.
The FBI and CISA are aware of reports of malicious cyber actors likely using exploits against CVE-2021-44077 to gain access [T1190] to ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus, as early as late October 2021. The actors have been observed using various tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), including:
NTDS.dit
) [T1003.003] or registry hivesThe FBI and CISA are proactively investigating this malicious cyber activity:
Sharing technical and/or qualitative information with the FBI and CISA helps empower and amplify our capabilities as federal partners to collect and share intelligence and engage with victims, while working to unmask and hold accountable those conducting malicious cyber activities.
Click here for a PDF version of this report.
Click here for indicators of compromise (IOCs) in STIX format.
Compromise of the affected systems involves exploitation of CVE-2021-44077 in ServiceDesk Plus, allowing the attacker to:
C:ManageEngineServicedeskbinmsiexec.exe
, with a SHA256 hash of ecd8c9967b0127a12d6db61964a82970ee5d38f82618d5db4d8eddbb3b5726b7
. This executable file serves as a dropper and contains an embedded, encoded Godzilla JAR file.C:ManageEngineServiceDesklibtomcattomcat-postgres.jar
with a SHA256 hash of 67ee552d7c1d46885b91628c603f24b66a9755858e098748f7e7862a71baa015
.Confirming a successful compromise of ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus may be difficult—the attackers are known to run clean-up scripts designed to remove traces of the initial point of compromise and hide any relationship between exploitation of the vulnerability and the webshell.
APT cyber actors have targeted Critical Infrastructure Sector industries, including the healthcare, financial services, electronics and IT consulting industries.
67ee552d7c1d46885b91628c603f24b66a9755858e098748f7e7862a71baa015
068D1B3813489E41116867729504C40019FF2B1FE32AAB4716D429780E666324
759bd8bd7a71a903a26ac8d5914e5b0093b96de61bf5085592be6cc96880e088
262cf67af22d37b5af2dc71d07a00ef02dc74f71380c72875ae1b29a3a5aa23d
a44a5e8e65266611d5845d88b43c9e4a9d84fe074fd18f48b50fb837fa6e429d
ce310ab611895db1767877bd1f635ee3c4350d6e17ea28f8d100313f62b87382
75574959bbdad4b4ac7b16906cd8f1fd855d2a7df8e63905ab18540e2d6f1600
5475aec3b9837b514367c89d8362a9d524bfa02e75b85b401025588839a40bcb
ecd8c9967b0127a12d6db61964a82970ee5d38f82618d5db4d8eddbb3b5726b7
009d23d85c1933715c3edcccb46438690a66eebbcccb690a7b27c9483ad9d0ac
083bdabbb87f01477f9cf61e78d19123b8099d04c93ef7ad4beb19f4a228589a
342e85a97212bb833803e06621170c67f6620f08cc220cf2d8d44dff7f4b1fa3
805b92787ca7833eef5e61e2df1310e4b6544955e812e60b5f834f904623fd9f
3da8d1bfb8192f43cf5d9247035aa4445381d2d26bed981662e3db34824c71fd
5b8c307c424e777972c0fa1322844d4d04e9eb200fe9532644888c4b6386d755
3f868ac52916ebb6f6186ac20b20903f63bc8e9c460e2418f2b032a207d8f21d
342a6d21984559accbc54077db2abf61fd9c3939a4b09705f736231cbc7836ae
7e4038e18b5104683d2a33650d8c02a6a89badf30ca9174576bf0aff08c03e72
3c90df0e02cc9b1cf1a86f9d7e6f777366c5748bd3cf4070b49460b48b4d4090
b4162f039172dcb85ca4b85c99dd77beb70743ffd2e6f9e0ba78531945577665
e391c2d3e8e4860e061f69b894cf2b1ba578a3e91de610410e7e9fa87c07304c
bec067a0601a978229d291c82c35a41cd48c6fca1a3c650056521b01d15a72da
d0c3d7003b7f5b4a3bd74a41709cfecfabea1f94b47e1162142de76aa7a063c7
7d2780cd9acc516b6817e9a51b8e2889f2dec455295ac6e6d65a6191abadebff
POST requests sent to the following URLs:
/RestAPI/ImportTechnicians?step=1
seed.nkn[.]org
Note: the domain seed.nkn[.]org is a New Kind of Network (NKN) domain that provides legitimate peer to peer networking services utilizing blockchain technology for decentralization. It is possible to have false positive hits in a corporate network environment and it should be considered suspicious to see any software-initiated contacts to this domain or any subdomain.
[<time>]|[<date>]|[com.adventnet.servicedesk.setup.action.ImportTechniciansAction]|[INFO]|[62]: fileName is : msiexec.exe]
C:ManageEngineServiceDeskbinmsiexec.exe
C:ManageEngineServiceDesklibtomcattomcat-postgres.jar
C:WindowsTempScriptModule.dll
C:ManageEngineServiceDeskbinScriptModule.dll
C:Windowssystem32ME_ADAudit.exe
c:Users[username]AppDataRoamingADManagerME_ADManager.exe
%ALLUSERPROFILE%MicrosoftWindowsCachessystem.dat
C:ProgramDataMicrosoftCryptoRSAkey.dat
c:windowstempccc.exe
wmic.exe
)pg_dump.exe
to dump ManageEngine databasesNTDS.dit
and SECURITY/SYSTEM/NTUSER
registry hivesLSASS
(KDC Sponge)WinRAR
, csvde
, and other legitimate third-party tools for reconnaissance and exfiltration
Organizations that identify any activity related to ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus indicators of compromise within their networks should take action immediately.
Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus build 11306, or higher, fixes CVE-2021-44077. ManageEngine initially released a patch for this vulnerability on September 16, 2021. A subsequent security advisory was released on November 22, 2021, and advised customers to patch immediately. Additional information can be found in the Zoho security advisory released on November 22, 2021.
In addition, Zoho has set up a security response plan center that provides additional details, a downloadable tool that can be run on potentially affected systems, and a remediation guide.
FBI and CISA also strongly recommend domain-wide password resets and double Kerberos TGT password resets if any indication is found that the NTDS.dit
file was compromised.
Note: Implementing these password resets should not be taken as a comprehensive mitigation in response to this threat; additional steps may be necessary to regain administrative control of your network. Refer to your specific products mitigation guidance for details.
Immediately report as an incident to CISA or the FBI (refer to Contact information section below) the existence of any of the following:
Recipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.
For any questions related to this report or to report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, please contact:
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
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